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Abstract  - We investigate the deterrent effect on driving behavior due to the introduction of 
Demerit Point System in Italy. In addition, we measure the incapacitation effect on fatal accidents. 
Our findings highlight the high potential of the penalty system in reducing road fatalities through 
deterrence and incapacitation. Despite this, its aggregate effectiveness in Italy ultimately depended 
on the consistency of the enforcement design. We then suggest several policy options to increase 
road safety through a credible enforcement. 
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In most developed countries traﬃc laws are backed by a hybrid sanction system which
couples ﬁnes with a point - record mechanism (Point Record Mechanism, PRM henceforth).
A PRM is a sanctioning system that involves the allocation to oﬀenders of a number of
penalty points increasing with the seriousness of the illegal behavior that has been detected,
for a range of harmful acts. Once drivers accumulate penalty points beyond a given threshold,
the license suspension occurs.
In some countries like the UK, Australia, Canada and the US (where the adoption of
PRMs varies from one state to another), the assignment of penalty points takes the form of
a totting - up system (where infringers accumulate penalty points up to a given threshold),
while in others like Italy, Spain, and France, drivers have an initial credit of points which
they may progressively lose as violations are recorded over time. In some circumstances, the
number of penalty points to be imposed for a given oﬀense may also vary according to drivers’
experience or to the license class. This is the case for the US, Canada and Australia, where
the number of penalty points diﬀers according to the license category or to the number
of years the license has been held. In some other countries (mainly in Europe, with the
exception of Germany and the UK), the assignment of penalty points is counterbalanced by
redemptive mechanisms consisting in the full or partial reinstatement of drivers’ points tally,
once they have kept their record clean for a given time - span or once they have completed
a driving course.
The widespread adoption of the PRM to prevent traﬃc oﬀenses relies mainly upon its
potential to solve moral hazard and adverse selection problems through the deterrence of
responsible drivers and the incapacitation of reckless ones ( Bourgeon and Picard, 2007).
Besides, the accumulation of penalty points in drivers’ oﬀense history may exert a warn-
ing eﬀect ( Basili and Nicita, 2005) which improves uninformed drivers’ ability to assess
their risk of accidents. Moreover, the provision for suspending the licenses of systematic in-
fringers acts as an ’incapacitation tool’ which may improve road safety through an increase
in deterrence ( Ehrlich, 1991). Actually, a PRM can be considered a mechanism that im-
poses higher sanctions for repeat oﬀenders, whenever a Beckerian optimal ﬁne may generate
underdeterrence ( Becker, 1968; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000; Garoupa, 2001). By tracking
drivers’ oﬀense history through the progressive reduction of their endowment of points, it
allows the authorities to put on a given oﬀense a weight which increases with the number
of previously detected infractions. This is because the higher the number of past detected
oﬀenses, the greater the probability, at the margin, of exceeding the established threshold
of penalty points that triggers the non - monetary sanction of license suspension. Indeed,
assuming that individuals maximize the sum of their payoﬀs over diﬀerent periods, they will
know that if caught committing an oﬀense, they will incur an immediate sanction and that,
because of their record, any sanction they will face in a subsequent period will be greater
than it would be otherwise ( Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1991; Polinsky and Shavell, 1998).
Several country - based studies provide evidence of the mentioned virtues of the PRM
showing the ability of this sanctioning system to: increase deterrence ( Haque, 1990; Zaal,
1994; Vaa, 2000; Zambon et al. (2008)); improve road safety, i.e. through a decrease in the
number of road accidents, deaths and people injured, and hospitalizations ( Poli de Figueiredo
et al. (2001); Papaioannou et al. (2002); Hussain et al. (2006); Zambon et al. (2007)); and
to discriminate between diﬀerent categories of drivers according to their propensity to oﬀend.
1Speciﬁcally, some analyses highlight that the PRM enables the prediction of any given driver’s
likelihood of being involved in accidents or receiving convictions in subsequent periods on the
basis of his or her record ( Chipman and Morgan, 1975; Chen et al. (1995); Diamantopoulou
et al. (1997)).
Despite the extensive use of the penalty points system to prevent undesirable driving
behaviors, the optimal features of a PRM, from the social welfare maximization perspective,
have been investigated only recently ( Bourgeon and Picard, 2007). According to this inves-
tigation, an optimal PRM that prevents normal drivers from obtaining a major utility by
driving recklessly exhibits the following features: (i) a limited initial endowment of points to
avoid drivers engaging in a trigger strategy consisting in no eﬀort as long as their credit of
points is greater than a critical threshold; (ii) a maximum ﬁne - when it is adopted within
a hybrid sanction mechanism - whatever is the driver’s point record and whatever is the
combination of the period of license deprivation and the initial endowment of points char-
acterizing the PRM in question; (iii) an automatic license suspension when the oﬀense that
has been committed is particularly serious (because the more serious is the oﬀense, the more
likely is the chance that it has been committed by a reckless driver) - and, when reckless
drivers represent a small fraction of the total population of drivers, to avoid problems of
forbearance on the part of the enforcement authorities; (iv) the length of the period that
has to be spent without oﬀenses for a clean record to be reinstated (redemptive mechanism)
should be determined taking into account the initial endowment of points and the length of
the suspension period.
Following the mentioned theoretical analysis analysis ( Bourgeon and Picard, 2007), this
article provides a ﬁrst empirical investigation of the optimality of the Italian PRM introduced
in July 2003. Speciﬁcally, we analyze whether signiﬁcant eﬀects on road safety, as proxied
by the number of road accidents occurring, have been produced through: (i) the deterrence
of speeding behaviors, which according to the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT, 2008b)
is the driving oﬀense most frequently detected on Italian roads and most strongly correlated
with the likelihood of future accidents ( Redelmeier et al. (2003); Liu et al. (2005); Williams
et al. (2006)); (ii) the ’incapacitation eﬀect’, generated by the suspension of reckless drivers’
licenses, on road accidents.
To the ﬁrst aim, by exploiting a ’before and after’ analysis (i.e. before and after the
introduction of the PRM) over the period 2001 - 2008, we performed a Lowess estimate of:
(a) the dynamics of the monthly number of speeding infractions per 1,000 vehicles, thus
controlling for seasonal eﬀects (i.e. ensuring that a reduction or an increase of infractions is
not determined by the presence on roads of a lower or greater number of vehicles because of
e.g. a holiday period); (b) the dynamics of the monthly number of accidents, also per 1,000
vehicles; and thus to detect any parallels there may be between speeding oﬀenses and road
safety. The non - parametric estimates have been employed essentially to capture the presence
of statistically signiﬁcant non - linearities in the dynamics of speeding oﬀenses and accidents,
i.e. decreasing and/or increasing trends, which may be ascribable to the introduction of the
new sanctioning system. To ascertain whether road safety beneﬁted from the incapacitation
of dangerous drivers, we performed a 3SLS regression, taking into account the potential
endogeneity between suspended licenses (which is our measure of incapacitation) and road
accidents (which is our proxy for road safety).
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm the view that the incapacitation of reckless drivers is an eﬀective
2tool to improve road safety ( Bourgeon and Picard, 2007), as shown by the negative and
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between road accidents and the number of suspended
licenses. However, the adoption of the point - record driving license in Italy exerted only a
temporary eﬀect on the dynamics of both speeding oﬀenses and road accidents. Actually,
corresponding to the coming into force of the new penalty system the dynamics of speeding
tickets experienced a statistically signiﬁcant decreasing trend which, however, ended just a
few months later when speeding oﬀenses began an indeﬁnitely increasing trend for the next
six years. Similarly, the indeﬁnitely decreasing trend in accidents - which appears to be
common to most European countries (European Road Safety Observatory, 2008) and which
was already in place before the the introduction of the PRM - appears to have beneﬁted
only temporarily from the introduction of the PRM. This result, emerging from our non
- parametric estimates, is also conﬁrmed by the estimate of a parametric model through
Poisson regressions.
Moreover we observed a strong ’announcement eﬀect’ when, two years before the eﬀective
implementation of the new law, a steep decrease in the number of speeding tickets and road
accidents followed the mere announcement of the project by the Italian Government. We
explain both the announcement eﬀect in 2001 and the temporary eﬀect in 2003 as the result
of drivers’ expectations of an increase in the likely level of penalties and we attribute the
subsequent increase in the level of infractions to drivers learning about the real value of the
likely penalties, as determined by the eﬀective detection and conviction probabilities.
What drivers have learned is that the authorities’ lax attitude toward enforcement did
not change with the new law and especially did not increase in consequence of the adoption
of harsher penalties for traﬃc law infringements, as our non - parametric estimates of the
dynamics of speeding controls show. In addition, the probability of having penalty points
charged and thus of incurring a license suspension was, in fact, much lower than expected.
Our work is the ﬁrst empirical analysis of the implementation of the optimal penalty
scheme ( Bourgeon and Picard, 2007), with speciﬁc reference to Italy. Our results provide
new insights into the analysis of these scholars by showing the relevance of ’announcement
eﬀects’, drivers’ learning, and enforcement consistency (as to the optimal combination be-
tween detection and conviction probabilities) in determining the eﬀectiveness of PRM in
reducing road accidents.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Italian PRM. Section 3 and 4
present, respectively, the data and the methodology employed in the empirical analyses.
Section 5 illustrates and discusses the ﬁndings of our econometric investigations. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Italian point - record driving license
Italy shows one of the highest ﬁgures for road fatalities among European countries, with
highways displaying a death rate (number of deaths every 100 accidents) triple that of urban
roads. Road accidents, which cause a loss of 2% in terms of GDP, are responsible for 2% of
the total number of deaths and represent the most frequent cause of death for people aged
between 25 - 291 in Italy . In addition, among the several causes of road fatalities, driving
behaviors such as alcohol and drug consumption and speeding have been identiﬁed as some
1Source: Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT, 2008a).
3of the most important. Actually speeding, which is the main focus of our work, accounts
for 30.10% and 12.03% respectively of the causes of highway and urban roads accidents
attributable to the driver’s behavior2, (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2), being therefore in line with
those analyses deﬁning speeding as the driving behavior most strongly correlated with the
likelihood of future accidents ( Redelmeier et al. (2003); Liu et al. (2005); Williams et al.
(2006)).
The Italian PRM came into force in July 2003 3 with the aim of tackling the question of
road safety in Italy. Its adoption concluded a long as well as uncertain legislative procedure
started two years earlier when Parliament empowered the Italian Government4 to introduce
this additional sanction system.
The reform of the Italian Traﬃc Code was characterized by several delays which often
cast doubts on the timing of the actual coming into force of the PRM. Indeed, Delegated
Law No. 85/2001, which authorized the Government to implement the mentioned reform,
was acknowledged by the Executive only one year later with Legislative Decree No. 9/20025.
Legislative Decree No. 9/2002 described the main features the Italian PRM should have and
stated that the new penalty system would come into force in January 2003. However, due
to the delays experienced in the creation of an electronic dataset containing Italian drivers’
records - the electronic dataset was necessary in order to automatically track the changes in
each driver’s record - it proved impossible to introduce the Italian PRM in January 2003.
Despite this delay, no oﬃcial communications were made about a revised date of entry into
force of the PRM. The lack of any oﬃcial information about the ’true’ date of coming into
force of the new penalty system generated uncertainty in drivers’ expectations about the
timing of the enforcement of the new system.
It was not until almost two months later, at the end of February 2003, that a vague
hint about the date on which the PRM would come into force was given. During a session
of the Parliamentary Commission on Transport, Post and Telecommunications6, the Italian
Ministry of Transport announced that, given the delays in the enforcement of the new sanc-
tioning system, a new decree law would be enacted, probably around June 2003, in order to
make the PRM eﬀective. However, the Ministry neither speciﬁed a precise date in which the
decree law would be approved nor when it, and therefore the PRM, would come into force.
The decree in question was Decree Law No. 153/2003, which was enacted at the end of June
2003 and which conclusively established the date of entry into force of the Italian PRM as
July 1, 2003.
The Italian PRM is characterized by assigning to each driver an initial credit of 20 points.
Once a given oﬀense is committed, the driver loses a number of points which varies according
to the seriousness of the committed oﬀense. Unlike other countries adopting a PRM, in Italy,
once the initial endowment of points is exhausted, the driver’s license is not automatically
2Source: our computation of the data provided in Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT, 2008b).
3Decree law n. 153/2003, ”Modiﬁche ed integrazioni al codice della strada”, published on the Italian Oﬃcial
Bulletin n. 149. Available at: www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/decreti/03151d.htm, (in Italian).
4Delegated law n. 85/2001, ”Delega al Governo per la revisione del nuovo codice della strada”, published on
the Italian Oﬃcial Bulletin n. 76. Available at: http://www.parlamento.it/leggi/01085l.htm, (in Italian).
5Legislative decree n. 9/2002, ”Disposizioni integrative e correttive del nuovo codice della strada, a norma
dellarticolo 1, comma 1, della legge 22 marzo 2001, n. 85”’, published on the Italian Oﬃcial Bulletin n. 36.
Available at: http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/02009dl.htm, (in Italian).
6See the Transcription of the session of the Parliamentary Commission on Transport, Post and Telecommuni-
cation held on February 27, 2003. Available at: http://wai.camera.it, (in Italian).
4suspended. Instead, drivers are merely required to attend a driving course and to pass a
written and practical test within 30 days from the zeroing of their points endowment. The
suspension occurs if, and only if, within the 30 days they fail to attend the driving course or
do not pass the tests. In the time span between the complete exhaustion of points and the
driving tests, drivers are allowed to drive. Moreover, when several infringements are detected
at once, no more than 15 points can be deducted, even though the total number of detected
infractions could otherwise be enough to lead to the suspension of the driver’s license.
Nonetheless, the Italian Traﬃc Code also provides for the crediting of points every two
years for drivers who have kept a clean record. Speciﬁcally, if for two consecutive years a
driver does not commit infractions entailing the deduction of points, the initial credit of
20 points is restored. When he does not commit infractions for two consecutive years and
moreover he has maintained at least 20 points, he receives a further credit of two points.
This is entirely unique to Italy. Indeed, in other European countries, such as both
Germany and the United Kingdom, not only does the suspension of a driver’s license occur
automatically once a given threshold of accumulated penalty points is reached, but also no
extra points are given for good behavior (which in truth might reward not the ’good’ but
merely the ’lucky’), while in Spain and France, bonus points are given but less generously.
In Spain, drivers get two points only after three years without committing an infraction, and
just one point after another three years, up to a maximum of 15 points. The same applies
to the initial score, which is a determining factor in establishing how fast one might lose all
one’s points, hence the opportunity cost of breaking the rules. 12 points are given in France
and Spain, and 18 in Germany.
Similar remarks also apply with respect to non - European countries like Canada, Aus-
tralia, and United States which adopt a totting - up system and discriminate between new
and fully licensed drivers (Canada, and US), or between diﬀerent classes of licenses (Aus-
tralia) in the determination of both the number of penalty points to be charged for a given
oﬀense, and the duration of the license’s suspension. Any of these countries’ traﬃc laws
provide for the crediting of points in case of virtuous driving behavior, and the rules gov-
erning the license’s suspension appear particularly severe. For example, in Canada, the
suspension of the driver’s license occurs once 15 (in the case of fully licensed drivers) or nine
penalty points (in the case of new drivers) have been accumulated. The suspension, which
lasts respectively 30 or 60 days, is extended up to six months if the threshold of 15 or nine
points is reached once again after the ﬁrst suspension has occurred. In the US, where many
States apply a PRM, the suspension of the driver’s license may occur, e.g. in California and
Colorado, when diﬀerent thresholds of charged penalty points have been reached, varying
according to the speed with which they have been accumulated. In Australia, drivers may
be disqualiﬁed from driving after accumulating 12 or more penalty points within a three -
year period. The minimum suspension period is three months, plus one further month for
every extra four penalty points beyond the license’s limit. Drivers may avoid the suspension
by applying for a ’good behavior’ period of 12 months. However, if they accumulate two
further points during the good behavior period they have their license suspended for double
the original period.
The possibility of distinguishing between ’good’ and merely ’lucky’ drivers has been fur-
ther compromised by a partial reform of the Italian traﬃc code, introduced in 2006, which
has severely aﬀected the functioning of the PRM. Speciﬁcally, since October 2006 drivers
5have been allowed to avoid the reduction of their endowment of points thanks to the so -
called ’salva punti’ decree7. This decree establishes that when the owner of the vehicle is
notiﬁed of an infraction (e.g. because it was impossible to identify the person driving at the
time the infraction was recorded, as in the case of speeding oﬀenses detected by cameras),
the owner has the duty, if he was not driving when the oﬀense was committed, to provide
the personal details of the person driving his vehicle at that time. If he is not able to identify
them, he will be held responsible for the infraction and will have to pay a ﬁne, but contrary
to what might be expected, he does not lose points. The provisions of the ’salva punti’
decree oﬀer drivers a very useful loophole by which to avoid the reduction of points in case of
infringements. Actually in Italy it is quite common, when a sanction is notiﬁed, for drivers
to lie to the authorities and declare that they were not driving at the time the oﬀense was
committed and identifying instead another person, e.g. a member of their family attaching
low value to preserving points, as guilty of the traﬃc oﬀense. This happens very often in
the case of speeding infractions, which are mostly detected by cameras. Considering that
speeding oﬀenses are the most commonly detected violation on Italian roads and that they
are among the most important causes of road fatalities, the opportunity for dangerous drivers
to evade the assignment of penalty points by this means appears particularly worrying.
3 Description of the data
This Section oﬀers an overview of the sources, the main descriptive statistics, and the
motivations underlining the choice of the variables used in our econometric analyses. The
performed empirical analyses aim to understand whether: (i) the introduction of a PRM to
back traﬃc infractions has produced positive eﬀects on speeding behaviors through general
deterrence; (ii) the dynamics of speeding oﬀenses shows parallels with that of accidents, as
consequence especially, of the adoption of the new sanction system; (iii) the physical removal
of dangerous drivers from roads through their license suspension, because e.g. they have lost
all the points available to them, beneﬁts road safety.
Speeding deterrence and road safety
To this end, we mainly exploited the dataset of the Italian state police which provides
evidence on the daily number of: (i) recorded infractions, with reference to diﬀerent types of
traﬃc oﬀenses; (ii) accidents; (iii) persons injured or dead in accidents; (iv) police patrol cars
on duty; (v) suspended licenses; and (vi) withdrawn vehicle booklets of circulation. These
data are provided with reference to both highways and other roads, i.e. state, regional,
provincial, and municipal roads, as they are recorded by the Italian Police since March 1st
20018.
Speciﬁcally, the dataset makes publicly available evidence about the following traﬃc law
violations: (i) speeding (Art. 142 of the Italian traﬃc code, ITC henceforth); (ii) driving at
a dangerous speed (Art. 141 of the ITC); (iii) driving without seat belts (Art. 172 of the
ITC); (iv) riding a motorcycle or a scooter without a helmet (Art. 171 of the ITC); (v)
7Decree Law No. 162/2006, ’Disposizioni urgenti in materia tributaria e ﬁnanziaria’, published in the Italian
Oﬃcial Bulletin No. 230. Available at: http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/decreti/06262d.htm.
8Italian state police dataset ”Incidenti e contravvenzioni giorno per giorno”, (in Italian). Available at: http:
//www.poliziadistato.it/pds/stradale/archivio/index.php, (accessed October 2008).
6driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol (Art. 186 of the ITC); (vi) driving under the inﬂuence
of drugs (Art. 186 of the ITC); (vii) unauthorized speed competitions (Art. 9 (ii) and (iii)
of the ITC); (viii) oﬀenses related to vehicle lighting system use (Art. 152 of the ITC); and
(ix) oﬀenses related to headphone and speaker phone system use (Art. 173 of the ITC).
We collected monthly observations on speeding infractions and with reference to highways
only for the period March 2001 (the ﬁrst month covered by the dataset) through September
2008 (the month before we conducted the investigation presented in the paper) inclusive.
Once we adjust for the main determinants of the number of infractions recorded by the
police, i.e. level of implemented enforcement and volume of traﬃc, this time - frame allows
us to compare the dynamics of one of the types of driving behavior most responsible for
accidents, i.e. speeding (Italian Institute of Statistics - ISTAT, 2008b), before and after the
entry into force of the Italian PRM, which occurred in July 2003.
We decided to focus only on registered violations on highways to guarantee that the
selected sample of infractions and accidents was representative. In fact, the Italian state
police dataset does not represent the entire population of traﬃc violations occurring on roads
other than highways. This is because for roads other than highways the Italian state police
is one of the several bodies in charge of detecting illicit traﬃc behaviors: i.e. Carabinieri,
Vigili Urbani, Polizia Provinciale, Guardia di Finanza, Guardia Forestale, etc. Conversely,
the Italian state police is the main body responsible for detection of infractions occurring
on highways. Moreover, data on oﬀenses recorded by forces other than the Police are not
publicly available.
We decided to focus on speeding behavior for three reasons. First, it is considered among
the main causes of road fatalities across the world ( World Health Organization, 2004) being
thus probably the main activity governments try to prevent when adopting a PRM. Actually,
speeding has ascertained to be the second most frequent cause of accidents occurred on
roads other than highways (i.e. statal, regional, provincial, municipal, and urban roads) and
the third main determinant of the total number of accidents occurred on highways (Italian
Institute of Statistics - ISTAT, 2008b). Respectively, it accounts for 12.03% and 30.10% of
the causes, attributable to driver’s behavior, which have been ascertained to be responsible
for accidents occurred in these two categories of roads (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). Second,
speeding behavior has revealed to be particularly responsive to oﬀense - history sanction
mechanisms (e.g. Redelmeier et al. (2003)). Third, because of its peculiarities, speeding
is more suitable than other driving conducts to investigate agents’ (rational) responses to
changes in the sanction policies.
First of all, for speeding, the decision about whether to comply or not with traﬃc laws is
contextual to the activity of driving. The decision not to respect the imposed speed limits
is taken while driving or immediately before starting to drive. Conversely, alcohol and drug
- related oﬀenses do not possess this peculiarity. Indeed, the decision to drink alcohol or to
consume drugs may be taken in a wide time span preceding the decision to drive. Therefore,
at the moment at which alcohol and/or drug consumption occurs, the act of driving might
be only a possibility. In turn, this means that the cost represented by the expected sanction
for driving under the eﬀect of alcohol or drugs might not be internalized at all in the decision
to drink or take drugs. In other words, the infractions recorded in respect of these driving
actions might not reﬂect a decision about whether or not to respect traﬃc laws, given that
at the time when agents decided to consume alcohol or drugs, they may have not planned
7to drive at all. Moreover, factors other than the sanction scheme appear crucial in deterring
driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol or drugs. For example, the perception of what is safe
alcohol consumption has been shown to play an important role in the deterrence of drunk
driving ( Shepeherd, 2001). And similar remarks may apply for drug consumption. For these
reasons we decided to exclude from our analyses oﬀenses like driving under the inﬂuence of
drugs and driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol.
Secondly, the choice of driving speed is the result of a trade - oﬀ between time opportunity
costs, the expectations about the actual level of enforcement, and the perception of accident
risk - where this perception, however, does not fully internalize the possible eﬀects that
dangerous driving behavior might generate on other road users ( Cohen and Einav, 2003),
but only those on the driver himself ( Tarko, 2009), which make it particularly suitable for
testing the hypothesis of rational and strategic driving behavior. Conversely, other driving
behaviors like wearing a seat belt or a helmet do not involve any negative externality on
other road users, and overall, any opportunity cost similar to that mentioned for speeding
behavior. What actually counts in deciding whether or not to use these safety devices are
the gains in terms of personal safety and the expected sanction deriving from the violation
of the related legal provisions. Moreover, once law - abiding behavior is established, i.e.
people learn the importance of using helmets and safety belts for their personal safety, it is
reasonable to expect that any change occurring in the related enforcement system will not
aﬀect that behavior ( Benedettini and Nicita, 2010). For these reasons we decided to exclude
oﬀenses like driving without seat belts, and riding a motorcycle or a scooter without a helmet.
The oﬀenses cited in points (vii), (viii) and (ix) are not involved in our research not
only because they do not share the characteristics discussed above but also because the data
on the corresponding number of infractions are available only from September 2004. This
would have prevented us from conducting a ’before and after’ analysis and from assessing
the responses of agents to an increase in the expected sanction, associated with the coming
into force of the Italian PRM, with respect to these oﬀenses.
The traﬃc oﬀense named in the Police’s dataset as driving at a dangerous speed (Art. 141
of the ITC) is also not considered in the analyses because, despite its apparent similarities
with speeding, it concerns a set of driving behaviors, very diﬀerent one from another, for
which it is not possible to isolate the corresponding number of infractions. In fact, behaviors
considered ’dangerous’, and thus prohibited, include: driving at a very low speed, holding
competitions on roads, not maintaining safe distances from other vehicles, etc.
Our research also includes data on the monthly number of accidents occurring on high-
ways. Speciﬁcally, the Italian state police provides evidence of: (i) the total number of
accidents; (ii) the number of fatal accidents, out of the total; and (ii) the number of ac-
cidents with only injured persons, out of the total; and (iii) the number of accidents only
causing damages to vehicles, out of the total. To be precise, fatal accidents are deﬁned as
those involving at least one vehicle and at least one person killed regardless of the severity
of any other involved persons’ injuries, while accidents with only injured persons are those
involving at least one vehicle and at least one injured person, but no fatalities. Along data
on accidents, the Italian state police dataset provides also data on the number of persons
dead or only injuried in accidents.
The adoption of a PRM in Italy rests mainly on an attempt to reverse the dramatic
primacies this country shows with reference to road safety standards and which appear to
8be particularly serious in the case of highways. Indeed, Italy emerged in 2007 as the country
having the second highest number of fatalities per year (5,131) among the 27 countries of
the European Union, ranking second only to Poland (5,583 fatal accidents per year), and
ahead of the most advanced European states, like Germany, France, and UK which recorded
respectively 4,949, 4,620 and 3,823 road fatalities per year (Directorate for Energy and
Transport, 2009). In addition, Italy posts the highest number of fatalities due to car and
motorcycle crashes, accounting respectively for 30% and 28% of the total number of European
car and motorcycle deaths9. Looking more closely at highways, which are the focus of our
article, an even more dramatic picture emerges. Not only are accidents on Italian highways
characterized by particularly serious consequences - during the period 2001 - 2007 highways
exhibited an average mortality rate equal to 4.63 deaths every 100 accidents, against 1.44 for
urban roads (Italian Institute of Statistics - ISTAT, 2008b) - but they are also worryingly
high compared to the rest of Europe. Currently, the Italian rate of highway fatalities per
1,000 km of road is equal to 100 and is thus substantially above the European average, which
is about 49, and slightly below countries like Greece and Luxembourg which show a number
of deaths per 1,000 km of 198.1 and 104.3 respectively10.
In deriving our conclusions we wanted also to be sure that the results appearing from
the non - parametric estimates would not be driven by changes in the implemented level
of enforcement and thus in the ability of the deputed enforcement ’mechanisms’ to detect
traﬃc infractions. To this end, we constructed a composite index, called Enforcement index,
obtained by adding together the monthly number of deployed police patrol cars and cameras.
Because the Italian state police dataset does not provide information on the latter (i.e. data
on patrol cars are available from September 2004 and thus do not cover the whole examined
period, while data on cameras are not available at all), these ﬁgures were provided by the
Direzione della Polizia Stradale (Traﬃc Police Directorate).
Finally, we wanted to be sure that our results would not be driven by the variability of the
number of road users. To this end we collected data on monthly traﬃc volume on highways
(i.e. total number of vehicles on the road: number of light vehicles plus number of heavy
vehicles) during the period studied, from the dataset of the Associazione Italiana Societa’
Concessionarie Austostrade e Trafori (Italian Association of the Societies Responsible for
Highways and Tunnels). In order to adjust for variations in traﬃc volume, in our non -
parametric regressions we divided the monthly number of recorded speeding infractions by
the monthly total number of vehicles using highways, and performed our non - parametric
estimates on the resulting ﬁgures. In this way we obtained the number of speeding tickets
per 1,000 vehicles, and thus drivers, thereby eliminating the risk that the dynamics of speed-
ing oﬀenses resulting from our non - parametric estimates might in fact be driven by the
dynamics of the highway traﬃc. Similar remarks apply for the non - parametric regression
implemented to estimate the dynamics of accidents.
Incapacitation and road safety
Our research aims also to examine whether the incapacitation of dangerous drivers
through the suspension of their license is an eﬀective tool to improve road safety. To this end
9European Road Safety Observatory Report (2008).
10European Road Safety Observatory Report (2008).
9we collected, from the online dataset of the Italian state police, data on the monthly num-
bers of suspended licenses11. Data on the number of suspended licenses contain aggregated
values for both highways and roads other than highways, i.e. national, regional, provincial
and municipal roads, thus making it impossible to obtain disaggregated data for these two
types of roads. Consequently, in order to assess the impact of incapacitation on road safety,
we were forced to employ a diﬀerent measure of road accidents than that used for the non -
parametric regressions. Speciﬁcally, we employed, as proxy for the level of road safety, the
monthly number of accidents occurring on the entire Italian road network (Italian Institute
of Statistics - ISTAT, 2008b). This was in order to avoid the possibility that, by using
data on accidents recorded by the Italian police, we would overestimate the eﬀects of license
suspension on road safety. Now, as discussed for traﬃc oﬀenses, the Italian state police
are one of several bodies in charge of detecting infractions and accidents on state, regional,
provincial, and municipal roads and therefore their dataset does not fully cover evidence for
roads other than highways. Conversely, the only data on the number of suspended licenses
are those provided in the Italian state police dataset.
Because of lack of evidence for earlier periods in the Italian state police dataset, data
on the number of suspended and revoked drivers’ licenses are available only from September
2004 onwards. Similarly, data on the monthly number of road accidents are available only
up to December 2007. In fact, at the time of writing the Italian Institute of Statistics has
yet to update data on accidents occurring in 2008. Thus our analyses refer to the period
September 2004 - December 2007.
To detect the eﬀect of incapacitation on road safety, as a control for the volume of traﬃc
observed on the entire population of roads we use data on the monthly number of circulating
vehicles (Automobile Club d’ Italia - ACI, 2009). Actually, if in the case of highways it is
possible to obtain data on the monthly volume of traﬃc (because these are publicly available
and easier to monitor), this is not the case for other roads, e.g. it would be diﬃcult to
monitor the daily, and then monthly, volume of traﬃc on urban roads. For these reasons,
we measured the volume of traﬃc by using the monthly total number of circulating vehicles
as recorded in the Italian vehicle register. Speciﬁcally we took the number of vehicles in
circulation at the end of 2003 and we then added, for every month, the number of new
registered vehicles minus the number of vehicles that have been removed from the register.
In addition, we control for weather conditions by using the average monthly level of pre-
11The Italian Traﬃc Code establishes the suspension or the repeal of the driving license in many hypotheses,
all characterized for having potentially or eﬀectively challenged road safety. For example, the suspension of the
driving license occurs in case of: (i) complete exhaustion of the initial endowment of points associated to the
driving license (art. 126 bis ITC); (ii) non authorized speed competition, (art 9 bis and ter ITC); (iii) temporarily
lack of the physical and psychic requisites required to conﬁrm driving license’ s validity or to obtain its review
(art. 128 ITC); (iv) driving a vehicle (car, motorcycles, etc.) with a non conform driving license (art. 125 ITC);
(v) breaking the imposed speed limit for a range of 40 Km/h - 60 km/h and beyond 60 Km/h (art. 142 ITC); (vi)
driving in the wrong direction in roads characterized by scarce visibility (art. 143 ITC); (vii) non - respect of road
signals within two years from the commission of a similar infraction (art. 146 ITC); (viii) non - respect of the rules
on overtaking within two years from the commission of a similar infraction (art. 148 ITC); (ix) driving without
the seat belt (art. 172 ITC) or the helmet (art. 171 ITC) within two years from the commission of a similar
infraction; (x) driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol (art. 186 ITC); (xi) driving under the inﬂuence of drugs
(art. 187 ITC). The driving license can be repealed, e.g., when: (a) infractions described in (ii) imply death or
serious injuries for third parties (art 9 bis and ter ITC); (b) permanent lack of the physical and psychic requisites
required to drive (see art. 130 ITC); (c) from the violation of one of the driving behavior rules established by the
Italian traﬃc code (art. 140 and subsequent articles ) derives deaths or serious injuries to third parties because
it has been committed while driving under the inﬂuence of drugs or alcohol (art. 130 bis ITC).
10cipitations in Italy. These data have been obtained by averaging the daily amount of precipi-
tation registered by each of the 187 methereological stations located across the whole Italian
territory. Data are provided by the European Climate Assessment & Dataset (ECA&D)12.
The estimate of the eﬀect of license suspension on road safety may be aﬀected by simul-
taneity problems. This is because the suspension of the driving license may also occur when
the authorities ascertain that the accident is the consequence of a driver’s actions, such as
drunk driving and drug driving13, etc. which incurs the suspension of the license. To avoid
endogeneity problems we implement a 3SLS regression to estimate a two - equation model
in which we allow accidents to be aﬀected by the license suspension and, simultaneously, the
license suspension to be inﬂuenced by accidents. To this aim, i.e. to estimate the endoge-
nous variable capturing the number of suspended license, we employ, besides the exogenous
regressors mentioned above with regard to the estimate of the number of accidents, a group
of variables accounting for: (i) the several type of oﬀenses, available in the dataset of Italian
state police, which may determine the license suspension. According to the Italian traﬃc
code these oﬀenses involve speeding, unauthorized speeding competitions, drug and drunk
driving; (ii) the number of police patrol cars on duty, as proxies of the implemented level of
controls.
In Table 1 we report the main descriptive statistics concerning highway oﬀenses and
accidents, as they result from the dataset of the Italian state police, as well as the other
variables used for our non - parametric and 3SLS regressions.
4 Methodology
In this work we investigate, ﬁrst, the eﬀects produced on agents’ attitudes toward compli-
ance with traﬃc rules by an increase in the expected sanctions, i.e. because of the introduc-
tion of a penalty point system coupled with the existing monetary sanctions, and, second,
the impact exerted on road safety by the incapacitation of dangerous drivers through the
suspension of their licenses.
Speeding deterrence and road safety
To accomplish the ﬁrst aim of the article we performed a Lowess estimate14 of the dynam-
ics over time of the number of highway speeding infractions and fatal accidents in order to
detect: (i) statistically signiﬁcant non - linearities in the dynamics of speeding oﬀenses ascrib-
able to the enforcement of the Italian PRM; and (ii) whatever the response from drivers may
have been to an increase in the expected sanction, whether that response shows a parallel
with accidents’ dynamics.
The reason why we employ a non - parametric estimator is essentially related to the
speciﬁc advantages that these methods provide compared with the traditional ones. To put
it precisely, when there is no prior knowledge of the type of relationship we are interested
in analyzing, or when one does not want to make any assumptions on the type of function
describing this (as is the case for the traﬃc oﬀense and accident dynamics), non - parametric
12See http://eca.knmi.nl/.
13See supranote 12.
14 Bowman and Azzalini, 1997 for a detailed insight on non - parametric methods of estimate.
11methods are a useful and straightforward tool to investigate and represent it, and to detect
the existence of any statistically signiﬁcant non - linearities that may be present. The
implemented non - parametric estimate performs a linear least squares regression to localized
subsets of the data. The size of the latter is deﬁned by the so - called bandwidth. The
bandwidth determines the smoothing of the estimated function. The larger the bandwidth
is, the more smoothed is the function; whereas the smaller it is, the more closely the function
ﬁts the data.
However, when the dependent variable is a time series and, thus, the independent variable
is represented by a generic function of time, it is usual to take into account the possible
presence of autocorrelated errors which may inﬂuence the smoothing of the data. Indeed,
when there is no prior knowledge of the function we are going to estimate and it is moreover
a function of time, it is not possible to address with certainty how much of the irregularity
in the collected data is due to the shape of the underlying unknown function (i.e. due to
whatever is the value of its second derivative at a given point in time) and how much to the
magnitude of the disturbance terms’ variance, i.e. var(et).
With this aim, and before the implementation of the local linear regression, it is praxis
to implement a two - step procedure aimed at computing the optimal bandwidth value to
be used for the estimate of the relationship we are interested in. This procedure consists of
separating the two potential determinants of the shape of the unknown function (i.e. the
irregularity in the observed data and the presence of autocorrelated error terms) by means of
the following steps: (1) a preliminary estimate of the unknown function, underlying the col-
lected data, has to be performed by choosing an arbitrary bandwidth, h, so as to oversmooth
rather than undersmooth the function; (2) the residuals obtained in step (1) then have to
be used to estimate the autocovariances of var(et) and to construct the related correlation
matrix ˆ R; (3) with the information obtained in step (1) and (2) the optimal bandwidth h∗
is then computed as that value which minimizes the generalized cross - validation criterion
deﬁned as:
GCVd(h) = RSS(h)/(1 − tr(S ˆ R))2
where RSS(h) is the residual sum of squares obtained in (1); S is the so - called smoothing
matrix (i.e. is an n × n matrix of weights, depending on the h used in (1) to obtain a ﬁrst
estimate of the unknown function), and ˆ R is the correlation matrix of the collected residuals.
This ratio corresponds to the Direct Cross - Validation Criterion, which is what we use in
our analysis.
Once the optimal bandwidth is computed and the non - parametric estimate is performed,
we are interested in testing the statistical signiﬁcance of the relationship emerging from the
latter. Speciﬁcally, to test the statistical signiﬁcance of any non - linearities which may
appear from the non - parametric regressions, we assume the linear model as the reference.
In other words, we test the null hypothesis of linearity of the resulting function against
the alternative hypothesis of non - linearity. The shaded area appearing in the graphics
presented in the article it is thus the reference band for the linear model. This band suggests
where the estimated relationship should lie if the null hypothesis is not rejected. Therefore,
if the resulting estimated function lies outside the reference band, this means that the null
hypothesis is rejected and that the displayed non - linearities are statistically signiﬁcant.
12All the estimates were performed using the sm package of the statistics software R.
Incapacitation and road safety
The eﬀect of incapacitation on road safety has been investigated by using a 3SLS regres-
sion in order to take into account the potential reverse causality concerning the accidents
and the number of suspended licenses. Actually, the number of suspended licenses may be
endogenous with respect to the number of occurred accidents. This is because it may happen
that the authorities ascertain that the accident is the consequence of a driver’s actions, such
as drunk driving and drug driving, etc. which incurs suspension of the license15. In the
presence of endogeneity the OLS estimator can produce biased and inconsistent parameter
estimates.
The 3SLS method allows, in this case, to estimate a two - equation model in which we
allow the number of suspended licenses to react to accidents and, contextually, accidents to
react to license suspension:
SuspLict = γ0+γaAcct+γsSpeedt+γuUnSpeedComp+γdAlct+γdDrugt+γpPolt+ut (1)
Acct = β0 + βsSuspLict + βvV eict + βpPrect + βtTime + βfFeb + βjJul + βxXt + ǫt (2)
Speciﬁcally, the 3SLS method consists of the following three steps. The ﬁrst step aims to
obtain the predicted value of the endogenous variable by regressing it on on all the exogenous
regressors of the model. In the second step, the predictions of the number of suspended
licenses found in the ﬁrst stage replaces SuspLict on the right hand side of equation (2) and
OLS is applied. The residuals of the OLS regression are then used to obtain an estimate
of the covariance matrix of the error terms of the two equations. In the third stage, the
estimate of the correlation matrix is used as a weighting matrix to calculate the generalized
least square estimator (GLS). The last two steps are iterated over the estimated disturbance
covariance and parameter estimates until the parameter estimates converge.
Speciﬁcally, the endogenous variable SuspLict has been instrumented with the monthly
number of infractions relative to those traﬃc oﬀenses determining the license suspension
accordingly to the Italian traﬃc code, and with the number of police patrol cars on duty, Polt,
on highways and roads other than highways, to account for the implemented level of controls.
Precisely, those traﬃc oﬀenses determining the license suspension and for which data were
available in the dataset of the Italian state police are the following: (i) speeding, Speedt;
(ii) drunk driving oﬀenses, Alct; (iii) drug driving oﬀenses, Drugt; and (iv) unauthorized
speeding competitions, UnSpeedCompt
16.
Variables in eq. (2) have the following meaning: Acct is the total number of accidents
occurred on both highways and roads other than highways during month t. In particular, it
15Actually, the Italian traﬃc code provides for the license suspension when from the violation of one of the
driving behavior rules it establishes by the Italian traﬃc code (art. 140 and subsequent articles) derives deaths
or serious injuries to third parties because it has been committed while driving under the inﬂuence of drugs or
alcohol. See supra note 12.
16See supra note 12.
13concerns the whole population of accidents independent of whether they have caused harm
to parties, what kind of harm they have caused in the case (i.e. death and/or non - fatal
injuries), their causes, and the number of involved vehicles. This variable represents our
proxy for the level of road safety. SuspLict, assumed to be endogenous, is the number of
suspended license during the month t. The number of suspended license is employed as
measure of the number of individuals who have been incapacitated, and thus prevented from
driving, because they have revealed to represent a serious threat for road safety. This because
they have lost all points available to them or because, independently from the number of
points still available to them, they have been detected while committing an oﬀense whose
seriousness implies the automatic suspension of the license17. V eict represents the number
of circulating vehicles during month t. It is a proxy for the volume of traﬃc experienced by
highways and roads diﬀerent from highways. Prect represents the amount of precipitation
during month t. Time represent the eﬀect of time. Feb and Jul are dummy variables which
take the value 1 for observations relating to the months of February and July respectively.
They have been employed to take into account the seasonality characterizing the time series
of the total number of accidents occurring. In fact, as emerges from Fig. 3, the time series of
the monthly total number of accidents displays a negative peak every February and a positive
peak every July. Xt is a group of controls. Speciﬁcally, we check for the robustness of the
results of our original second - stage regression by estimating three further speciﬁcations in
which we include the following controls: the number of withdrawn registration books (to
capture the extent of the measures undertaken to remove unsafe vehicles from the road18),
labeled as Bookt in the model, the monthly number of infractions due to oﬀenses related
to headphone and speaker phone system use, Phonet, and to vehicle lighting system use,
Lightt. These two latter variables have been considered in order to capture the frequency of
actions which may cause a loss of care and attention while driving like using hands to speak
on a cellphone, as well as unsafe driving behaviors, i.e. driving without using lights at all or
in a proper way.
The 3SLS regression has been performed by using the package reg3 of STATA.
5 Empirical results
In this Section we present the results of the econometric analyses performed to investi-
gate whether and in what way: (i) the adoption of a PRM aﬀected agents’ propensity to
speed, as evidenced by the number of highway speeding tickets per driver; (ii) the dynamics
of highway accidents show any parallels with the dynamics of speeding oﬀenses as aﬀected
by the introduction of a PRM; (iii) the non - monetary sanction consisting in the suspen-
sion of drivers’ license beneﬁts road safety as measured by the monthly number of accidents
occurring on highways and roads other than highways.
17See supra note 12.
18Indeed, the main function of this document is to prove that the vehicle to which it uniquely refers is safe
to drive. One of the main reasons leading to the withdrawal of the registration book is the vehicle’s failure to
conform to the minimum required roadworthiness standards to stay on the road. Other minor causes for revoking
the vehicle’s registration may be, e.g., driving with an expired driver’s license, riding a motorcycle without a
helmet, failure to update the registration book after the vehicle has undergone some technical changes, failure to
repair the vehicle when this is required by law, etc.
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Fig. 4 depicts the estimated dynamics of the monthly number of speeding oﬀenses per
driver. What immediately emerges from this ﬁgure is the steep decrease in the number of
speeding infractions per driver occurring in the sub - period March 2001 - January 2002. As
discussed in Section 2, in March 2001 it was announced that the Italian Parliament, by means
of Delegated Law No. 85/2001, had empowered the Government to review the Traﬃc Code
in force and to introduce the PRM as an additional sanction system. However, at that time
no information about the date of coming into force of the new measure was provided. The
announcement of the decision to reform the sanction system for traﬃc infractions informed
drivers only about an upcoming increase in the sanctions imposed for illegal driving actions
(i.e. the already existing ﬁnes would soon be coupled with penalty points); it neither implied
the immediate formal enforcement of the new measure, nor did it stipulate the date on which
the PRM would come into eﬀect. However, despite the impossibility of formally enforcing
the new sanction policy, the sharp reduction in the number of speeding tickets per driver
occurring in March 2001 tells us that the policy’s announcement triggered a strong reaction
in drivers’ behavior, which determined a reduction in speeding tickets per driver equal to
72.87%. In our opinion, the announcement of an upcoming increase in sanctions and the
uncertainty about when it would come into force determined an increase in compliance with
traﬃc laws due to a sort of ’wait and see’ behavior (that can be assimilated, in a certain
sense, to a ’mental accounting process’ - Sunstein, 1999) which may explain the statistically
signiﬁcant steep decrease we observe in the dynamics of speeding oﬀenses per driver. More
precisely, the uncertainty about the period of entry into force of the new system, as well
as about its salient features, induced drivers (or at least a substantial number of them) to
increase the level of care they took while driving in order to avoid the possibility (because
they were not perfectly informed about the date of entry into force of the PRM) of a higher
sanction if caught breaking speed limits.
This instance of an announcement eﬀect had run its course by around the end of January
2001 when the monthly number of speeding infractions per driver starts to indeﬁnitely in-
crease, but overall more precise information about the date of coming into force of the PRM
as well as about its main features was provided. As we know from Section 2, in January 2002
the Government promulgated Legislative Decree No. 9/2002 which acknowledged the autho-
rization to reform the Traﬃc Code granted by Parliament in Delegated Law No. 85/2001.
The legislative decree described the main features of the new sanction system and also stip-
ulated that it would come into force in January 2003. Once this more speciﬁc indication of
the timing of entry into force of the PRM was given, drivers progressively reverted to their
’usual’ level of (non -) compliance with traﬃc laws, leading to the progressive increase in
the dynamics of speeding infractions per driver that we observe after January 2002. This
happened because they realized that it was unnecessary, as well as costly, to continue to
maintain a higher level of caution than usual while driving.
This indeﬁnite rise in the monthly number of speeding oﬀenses per driver is interrupted
only about one year later when the dynamics of speeding oﬀenses experience a second sta-
tistically signiﬁcant decreasing trend (see the black line in Fig. 4). To be precise, we observe
that from March 2003 the dynamics of the recorded speeding infractions experience a reduc-
tion which lasts until about December 2003, when they start again to rise indeﬁnitely. We
15ascribe this temporary reduction in the number of speeding tickets per driver to a second
announcement eﬀect. Indeed, as reported in Section 2, at the end of February 2003 the Ital-
ian Ministry of Transport announced that, because of the delays experienced in the creation
of an electronic dataset containing Italian drivers’ records (which prevented the entry into
force of the PRM in January 2003) a new decree law would be enacted, probably around
June 2003, in order to put the PRM into eﬀect. However, the Ministry speciﬁed neither a
precise date by which the decree law would be approved nor when it and therefore the PRM
would come into force. Thus, we believe that a mechanism similar to that experienced in
March 2001 also came into play after the Ministry of Transport announcement. Once again,
the uncertainty about the exact date of coming into force of the more severe sanction system
made drivers adopt more cautious behavior, which resulted in a reduction of the number of
recorded speeding infractions per driver.
Paradoxically, the augmented level of drivers’ compliance with traﬃc laws triggered by
the second announcement was not strengthened by the eﬀective coming into force of the
new sanction policy, which occurred in July 2003. Indeed, as already stated, we observe that
speeding infractions start again to indeﬁnitely increase a few months after the introduction of
the PRM. The fact that, although the new sanction scheme was able to be formally enforced
(and that - unlike during the two announcement sub - periods - more severe sanctions were
eﬀectively in force), we do not observe a corresponding sustained decrease in the number
of infractions per driver, suggests to us that drivers were likely more concerned about the
detection policies that would have been implemented to support the introduction of the
new system rather than the resulting increase in sanctions. In fact, if this had not been
the case we should have observed, after the coming into force of the PRM and thus of an
eﬀective increase in the expected sanctions associated with traﬃc oﬀenses, that the number
of speeding infractions per drivers would have had to stabilize around at least a constant
level but would not have experienced an indeﬁnitely increasing trend over time as actually
appears from the non - parametric estimates.
In our opinion, the most plausible explanation justifying this evidence is that drivers
underwent a learning process about the probability of being detected observing that, despite
the adoption of more severe sanctions, the authorities’ lax attitude toward enforcement did
not change and especially did not increase in consequence of the adoption of harsher penalties
for traﬃc law infringements. Indeed, as conﬁrmed by the non - parametric estimates of the
dynamics of our Enforcement index (see Fig. 13), the number of deployed speeding control
devices appears to be decreasing over time. Actually, by considering a two - year window,
before and after the coming into force of the PRM, we observe a remarkable decrease in the
number of deployed speeding controls. Precisely, the average monthly number of speeding
controls was equal to 21870.04 during the sub - period July 2001 - June 2003 and equal
to 20415.60 during the sub - period July 2003 - July 2005, thus experiencing a reduction
of 6.65%. Therefore, once they learned that the established probability of detection was
independent of the increase in sanctions due to the coming into force of the penalty points
system, they progressively reverted to the level of compliance with traﬃc laws they had
maintained prior to the introduction of the PRM.
In addition, we claim that the progressive increase in the number of speeding infractions
per driver, triggered by the learning process drivers underwent regarding the risk of being
caught after the entry into force of the PRM, was further strengthened by the learning
16process they also underwent with reference to the probability of being convicted under the
new penalty scheme. Speciﬁcally, as time went by and they incurred infractions or they
merely acquired information about the functioning of the new sanction system from the
media or others drivers’ experiences ( Sah, 1991), they also realized that the probability of
having their license suspended was not as high as expected. As discussed in the Introduction,
the automatic deprivation of the license is a salient feature of PRM which aims to: (i)
characterize it as an oﬀense history - based mechanism; (ii) give credibility to authorities’
willingness to enforce it; (iii) incapacitate reckless drivers. Actually, what drivers mainly
learned about the new system was that the probability of having penalty points charged
and thus of eventually having their license suspended was much lower than expected on
the basis of the scheme’s announced aims and features. First of all, we refer to one of
the most important determinants concerning the eﬀectiveness of a PRM: the amount of
points initially allotted ( Bourgeon and Picard, 2007). As observed, the size of the credit
of points assigned to drivers is crucial in determining the speed at which they can be lost
(and therefore the speed at which the suspension of the license occurs) and it has to be
determined taking into account the delicate trade - oﬀ with the length of the suspension
period: i.e. it has to be deﬁned in such a way as not to undermine the incentive power of
the deprivation measure ( Bourgeon and Picard, 2007). In Italy, drivers are endowed with
an initial amount of 20 points which, as noted in Section 2, appears to be relatively high
compared with that allowed in other European and non - European countries. Thus, the
availability of such a large endowment of points probably has induced drivers to adopt a
trigger strategy ( Bourgeon and Picard, 2007) consisting in complying with traﬃc laws only
after a certain threshold of penalty points has been reached19. However, if measures like the
’salva punti’ decree20 are adopted and coupled with redemptive mechanisms, the threshold
that triggers compliance with traﬃc laws becomes even higher. Actually, not only has the so
called ’salva punti’ decree transformed penalty points into a monetary sanction in practice; it
has also prevented the PRM from exercising an eﬀective screening function between reckless
and responsible drivers. Indeed, because this provision oﬀers individuals the possibility of
avoiding the deduction of points by simply declaring that they were not at the wheel when
the oﬀense was detected, many dangerous drivers are allowed to commit infractions without
these being entered on their record. Therefore, potentially reckless drivers are being treated
on a par with law - abiding drivers and are paradoxically also allowed to beneﬁt from the
redemptive mechanisms provided by the Italian system which further opens the way, through
the supplementing of the points endowment, for illegal driving behaviors. Moreover, if we
consider that in Italy the suspension of the drivers’ license does not occur automatically in the
remote hypothesis (because of the redemptive mechanisms coupled with provisions like the
’salva punti’ decree) of the zeroing of the initial endowment of points, it is possible to further
understand the reasons for the failure of the Italian PRM to eﬀectively reduce undesirable
driving behavior. Actually, the automatic suspension of the license is a necessary condition
to ensure a credible commitment from the authorities in enforcing the new system and it
appears crucial when the oﬀense committed is particularly serious ( Bourgeon and Picard,
2007).
Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that the ineﬃcacy of the Italian PRM in per-
19Actually, this is what appears from a microeconometric analysis, on a sample of 50,000 drivers, concerning
the eﬀect of the Italian PRM on drivers’ attitude toward compliance with traﬃc rules ( Basili et al. (2009)).
20See Section 2 for an exhaustive illustration of the characteristics and implications of the ’salva punti’ decree.
17manently increasing deterrence of speeding behaviors can be considered the result of an
inadequate combination of the detection and conviction policies, overall, supporting its in-
troduction. Actually, for agents to be caught while infringing the law has a great informative
power about the subsequent probability of being convicted which in turn provides information
about the design of the adopted sanction mechanism and therefore of its actual characteris-
tics. Therefore, if drivers reveal to be sensitive to detection policies, as actually we argue on
the basis of our ﬁndings, but they learn that the probability of being detected is indepen-
dent from the introduction of the new penalty system and also that whether detected the
probability of having points charged and consequently the license suspended is meagre it is
reasonable to expect that the PRM loses its eﬀectiveness in reducing traﬃc oﬀenses.
It is important to note that only a divergence between expected and real apprehension
and conviction probabilities may explain our ﬁndings. Actually, as already mentioned earlier
in this article we have controlled for changes in the enforcement authorities’ ability to detect
infractions - and found that the number of speeding infractions was not correlated with
the number of deployed speeding controls21 - as well as for seasonal eﬀects, performing our
estimates on the number of infractions per vehicle.
Fig. 5 and 10 report the estimated dynamics of the monthly number on highways of
accidents in total22 and fatal accidents respectively. These pictures outline that accidents are
characterized by an indeﬁnitely decreasing trend over time. This feature, which appears to be
common to most European countries and was already in play before the period we consider
(European Road Safety Observatory, 2008), is the result of many contextual factors such as,
e.g. drivers’ experience Mayhew et al. (2003)), use of vehicle safety device ( Cummings et
al. (2002)), medical technologies ( Noland and Quddus, 2004), media campaigns ( Elder et
al. (2004)), transport policies facilitating reductions in the amount of motor - vehicle traﬃc,
road design, and the production of safer vehicles ( Ameratunga et al. (2006)). However, it
is unquestioned that policies aimed at improving road safety also play an important role.
As may be observed in Fig. 5 and more clearly in Fig. 10, after the coming into force of
the Italian PRM, the dynamics of accidents (both total and fatal) exhibited a statistically
signiﬁcant non - linearity (see the intervals delimited by the red and black lines in Fig. 5
and Fig. 10). Speciﬁcally, we observe that the rate at which accidents decreases became
faster. Indeed, the number of fatal accidents switched from a decrease at a constant rate
to a decrease at a accelerating rate. However, fatal accidents, and accidents in general,
beneﬁted only temporarily from the introduction of the PRM. Indeed, a few months later
fatal accidents resumed their usual constant rate of decrease. The PRM was prevented from
exerting a lasting eﬀect on accidents because, as outlined previously, it was ﬁrst prevented
from exerting a lasting and positive deterrent eﬀect on drivers’ speeding behavior, which
is important to remind is the main responsible for accidents, in Italy (Italian Institute of
Statistics - ISTAT, (2008b)). It is fair to say that the inconsistent design of both conviction
and detection policies in support of the new system weakened the chance of lasting deterrence
against dangerous speeding behavior and consequently the possibility also of permanently
slowing down the mortality rate.
A further evidence of the short - term eﬀect of the PRM on accidents also emerges from
the Poisson regressions represented in Table 3. Speciﬁcally, it is analyzed the eﬀect of the
21The correlation coeﬃcient is equal to - 0.1723 and is not statistically signiﬁcant.
22According to the Italian state police dataset it involves: (i) fatal accidents; (ii) accidents causing only injuries
to parties; and (iii) accidents causing only damages to vehicles. See Section 3 for further details.
18introduction of the PRM on all the types of accidents occurred on highways, as they result
from the Italian state Police, i.e.: (i) the total number of accidents; (ii) the number of fatal
accidents, out of the total; (iii) the number of accidents with only injured persons, out of
the total; and (iv) the number of accidents only causing damages to vehicles, out of the
total. The monthly number of highway accidents has been regressed, in each speciﬁcation,
for: (i) the average monthly level of precipitation, Prect; (ii) the amount of highway traﬃc
volume, V eicht; (iii) the number of deployed police patrol cars, Polt; (iv) a dummy variable
accounting for the positive peak accidents experience in the month of July, Jul; (v) a dummy
variable accounting for the negative peak accidents experience in the month of February,
Feb; (vi) a dummy variable, PRM, which takes value equal 1 for the months following the
introduction of the PRM, and equal to 0 otherwise; (vii) a variable measuring the eﬀect over
time of the PRM, DurPRM. Precisely, it counts the number of months since the PRM is
enforced23; and (viii) three variables accounting for temporal trends. Precisely, we put in
each speciﬁcation the trend t, t2, and t3.
Actually, the Poisson regressions in Table 3 highlight the occurrence of a ’discontinuity’,
in July 2003, in the dynamics of all the types of accidents (the coeﬃcient of PRM is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant for all speciﬁcations), but also that the eﬀect of the PRM is
vanishing over time (the coeﬃcient of DurPRM is not statistically signiﬁcant for any of
the four speciﬁcations). In addition, it appears that the coming into force of the PRM has
exerted a stronger eﬀect on fatal accidents (the coeﬃcient of PRM assumes the highest value
in the regression concerning fatal accidents), thus also conﬁrming the evidence of the non -
parametric estimates (i.e. the change in the accidents’ rate of decrease is more pronounced
for the dynamics of fatal accidents rather than that of the total amount of accidents, Fig.
5 and 10) and supporting the hypothesis of an increase in drivers’ caution due to a ’wait
and see’ behavior determined by the necessity to understand the rules of the new sanctioning
system. For purely descriptive aims, we report also graphically the evidence of a discontinuity
correspondingly to July 2003 in the dynamics of accidents (see Figs. 6 - 9).
Fig. 11, which represents the time series of both fatal accidents per vehicle and speeding
infractions per driver, captures another important feature of the dynamics over time of fatal
accidents. Actually, from Fig. 11 it is possible to observe a remarkable parallel between
the two time series, in the sub - period corresponding to the ﬁrst announcement eﬀect (i.e.
March 2001 - January 2002), which does not appear from the non - parametric regressions
which tend to capture only the behavior of a conditional average. What emerges is that
the steep decrease in the monthly number of speeding infractions captured by the non -
parametric regression in Fig. 4 and Fig. 11 is also observable in the time series of fatal
accidents. When speeding infractions decreased because of the ﬁrst announcement eﬀect,
the monthly number of mortal accidents sharply decreased too. Similar remarks apply for
the second announcement eﬀect.
However, a similar clear and strong parallel does not emerge with reference to the monthly
total number of highway accidents (see Fig. 12), whose time series during the sub - period
March 2001 - January 2002 does not experience a decrease like that of the fatal accident time
series (see Fig. 11). Indeed if fatal accidents reduced by 26.42%, total accidents decreased by
only 17.80%. Similarly to what found in the Poisson regressions, this reasonably strengthens
23Precisely, it takes value equal to 1 for July, 2003, equal to 2 for August, 2003, etc. Obviously, it takes value 0
for the months preceding July, 2003. If the PRM has had a vanishing eﬀect over time, the coeﬃcient of DurPRM
should be not statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent from zero
19the hypothesis that drivers exercised increased caution due to the announcement in 2001 of
the introduction of the PRM. The steep decrease that occurred during the sub - period March
2001 - January 2002 in the time series of fatal accidents certainly suggests that the reduction
in speeding, induced by the announcement, exerted positive eﬀects on the seriousness of
accidents. If the number of accidents did not decline to the same extent, as a consequence
of the ﬁrst announcement eﬀect, their seriousness conversely did so.
This evidence supports the idea that there is great potential for PRMs to shape agents’
behavior and by this means country - road safety standards, which are a crucial aspect in
governments’ decisions to adopt such sanctioning schemes. However, these ﬁndings also high-
light how the design of consistent conviction and detection policies plays a fundamental role
in making this potential enduringly eﬀective in improving road safety through the deterrence
of undesirable behavior.
Incapacitation and road safety
Table 2 illustrates our 3SLS estimates concerning the relationship between incapacitation
provisions, e.g. the suspension of drivers’ licenses, and road safety. Because of lack of data
on suspended licenses and on accidents for earlier and subsequent periods respectively, the
analysis has been performed with reference to the time - horizon September 2004 - December
2007.
Our regressions document a positive eﬀect on road safety of the incapacitation of dan-
gerous drivers. As appears from Table 3, the negative coeﬃcient of the number of suspended
licenses, SuspLict is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Our estimates also point out the importance of the implementation of policies aimed at
reducing traﬃc volume to improve road safety ( Ameratunga et al. (2006)). Actually, the
positive, robust and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the variable V eict suggests that the
number of accidents in a given time span rises with an increase in the number of vehicles on
the road.
Among the controls we added to account for the frequency on roads of potentially dan-
gerous driving behaviors, Phonet and Lightt, it emerges that the improper use of the vehicle
lighting system has a relatively higher importance, with respect to the non - use of speaker
phone or headphone devices, in determining accidents. All the other types of unsafe driving
behaviors which may inﬂuence the amount of occurred accidents are captured by the variable
SuspLict which is instrumented, besides the other variables represented in Table 3, by the
amount of speeding infractions, drug and drunk driving oﬀenses, and unauthorized speeding
competitions. It also emerges that, coeteris paribus, to remove unsafe vehicles from roads
does not aﬀect the amount of occurred accidents. Actually, the coeﬃcient of the variable
Bookt is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Our analysis outlines that to physically remove dangerous drivers from the road beneﬁts
road safety. These ﬁndings therefore strengthen the importance of having a PRM coupled
with eﬀective conviction policies, as we have stressed with reference to the results of our non -
parametric regressions. To be precise, we refer to the importance of implementing conviction
policies aimed at the eﬀective assigning of penalty points to drivers who have been caught
infringing the law, given that tracking oﬀense history with points is crucial to the removal
from roads, through license suspension, of dangerous drivers.
206 Conclusions
Speeding is deemed to be one of the main causes of road traﬃc injuries. By measuring
deterrence and incapacitation eﬀects, we investigated whether, as a consequence of the in-
troduction of the point - record driver’s license in Italy, drivers have become law - abiding
and improvements in road safety have occurred.
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm the high potential of the PRM, as outlined by Bourgeon and Picard,
2007, in three respects:
(i) deterrence increased, but only temporarily, due to the announcement eﬀects;
(ii) a discontinuity in the dynamics of accidents;
(iii) incapacitation by means of license suspension reduces fatalities at the margin.
However, our results dramatically outline the crucial role of enforcement consistency on
adaptive strategies of rational drivers. In Italy the introduction of the new system was not
accompanied by an increase in drivers’ perception of the eﬀective probability of being caught:
the total number of ﬁxed and mobile speed traps, such as cameras and patrol cars, did not
change after the introduction of the new law.
Paradoxically, as mentioned above, upon the coming into force of the PRM and in the
following months the number of controls was substantially reduced. As a consequence, Italian
motorists with a propensity to break traﬃc laws - who had demonstrated respect for the new
laws when they ﬁrst came into force - soon learned that the real probability of being punished
had not changed at all, and in Becker - like fashion adapted their behavior to the information
acquired, thus reducing their level of compliance with the rules of the road.
As for the PRM, which more than all other measures was meant to increase penalties and
’punish’ the worst oﬀenders, its eﬃcacy as a deterrent was also compromised by the factors
that make it unique with respect to those in other countries. Such factors include bonus
points for drivers who theoretically abide by the law, the fact that licenses are not suspended
automatically when they no longer have any points, and the so - called ’salva punti’ decree.
This last, by removing the threat of lost points if the owner of the vehicle does not say who
was driving at the time of the infraction, is hardly diﬀerent from a return to the old, pre -
demerit point system for violations (like speeding) whose real perpetrator cannot be easily
identiﬁed by the police. It has provided individuals with the chance to commit infractions, lie
by saying they were not behind the wheel at the time, and save points - thus weakening not
only the deterrent eﬀect but also the function of limiting the eﬃcient number of infractions,
while keeping one’s score intact and actually earning bonus points for good conduct that is
anything but. Under these circumstances, even the harshening of non - monetary penalties
after 2003 appears to have had no additional deterrent eﬀect.
Once again, it appears, the failure of measures that have actually had quite an impact
on existing law is explained by the lack of a coherent enforcement policy, which changes
individuals’ perception of the likelihood of being caught and reduces the cost associated
with breaking traﬃc rules.
Given the above, we can make some observations on possible countermeasures that might
be taken to improve the deterrent eﬀect of eﬀorts such as the point - record driver’s license
which try to make roads safer by altering driving habits. Obviously, in consideration of what
we have learned, an important starting point is to achieve better enforcement of the law.
Many empirical studies have found that the use of adequate controls, in the case of new laws
designed to impose harsher penalties, is fundamental to the success of road safety programs
21( Tay, 2005; Zambon et al. (2008); Davis et al. (2006)) and to cause positive spillovers in
driving habits that are not directly inﬂuenced by those programs ( Tay, 2005).
With speciﬁc reference to the PRM, it also seems wise to increase the cost associated
with especially dangerous conduct and therefore with the loss of points. All other conditions
remaining equal, for example, we believe that the number of points deducted for highly
dangerous actions such as speeding should be increased. Likewise, the number of points
should be raised when the infraction is committed at times when the fatality rate is highest,
e.g. nights and weekends.
It goes without saying that making the Italian PRM more like those in other European
countries would also be beneﬁcial. Suspending licenses automatically, reducing or eliminating
bonus points (especially since the ’salva punti’ decree damaged the credibility of safe driver
status), and lowering the number of starting points are all measures that would help make
the loss of points more costly and perhaps the whole system more eﬀective.
Since detection and conviction probabilities both positively aﬀect deterrence and incapac-
itation for speed limits infractions we suggest that in order to avoid drivers’ adverse learning
phenomena, the introduction of a penalty points system should be coupled not just with
harsher ﬁnes, but also with signiﬁcantly higher rates of apprehension and conviction.
22Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Italian state police data on highways
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Speed. infractions 91 37349.53 11985.63 12794 58407
Driving at dangerous speed infr. 91 2203.11 320.0496 1522 3105
Driving. without seat belts infr. 91 3602.33 1718.183 1668 7456
Riding without the helmet infr. 91 315.5275 337.7164 29 1474
Driving under the inﬂ. of alch. infr. 91 417.5275 69.57943 257 636
Driving under the inﬂ. of drugs infr. 91 44.50549 16.25517 19 101
Unauthorized speed. competitions
24 49 7 11.41089 0 72
Vehicle light. system use infr. 49 1072.898 290.8417 606 2427
Headph. and speaker ph. system use infr. 9 1420.816 207.8817 1022 1866
Tot. accidents 91 3509.791 466.0103 2438 4731
Fatal acc. (out of the total) 91 40.1978 12.02056 21 70
Acc. with injured persons (out of the total) 91 1053.978 169.6131 680 1452
Acc. with veich. damages (out of the total) 91 2421.824 313.1201 1734 3230
Deaths 91 47.34066 14.79731 23 86
Injured persons 91 1739.275 333.5847 1079 2790
Highway circulating vehicles
25 91 6629.104 867.9919 5005.2 8465.9
Police patrol cars 91 19713.33 2370.91 17438 40542
Cameras 91 1096.78 204.943 704 1586
Enforcement Index 91 20810.11 2337.85 18359 41344
Suspended licenses 49 6153.816 874.9193 4557 8285
Withdrawn vehicle booklets of circulation 49 6999.02 1359.983 4198 10570
3SLS regressions data
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total accidents
26 40 19573.85 2212.953 15922 23734
Suspended licenses 40 6104.875 944.3472 4557 8285
Speeding infractions 40 82694.77 13303.81 58222 109379
Driving under the inﬂ. of alc. infr 40 2221.25 499.7635 1473 3410
Driving under the inﬂ. of drugs infr 40 167.35 51.39767 69 304
Unauthorized speed. competitions 40 22.725 22.39275 0 104
Light. system infr. 40 2714.3 2714.3 1430 4587
Headph. and speaker ph. system use infr. 40 3393.075 496.9538 2509 4657
Police patrol cars 40 43316.43 1923.386 39409 47006
Circulating vehicles
27 40 4.68e+07 940061.8 4.53e+07 4.82e+07
Withdrawn booklet of circulation 40 6838.875 1367.49 4198 10570
Precipitation 40 24.56 13.18 3.62 55.09
Notes: 1. Variables with 49 observations are those for which the dataset of the Italian state police
provides evidence only since September 2004; 2. Source: AISCAT (2009); 3. Source: ISTAT (2008b); 4.
Source: our computation of the data provided by ACI (2009).
23Table 2
The eﬀect of PRM on accidents
Poisson regressions
Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticiy) in parenthesis.












































































Obs. 91 91 91 91
Pseudo R sq. 0.70 0.27 0.59 0.67
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
24Table 3
Incapacitation and road safety
3SLS regressions
Standard errors in parenthesis












































































































































































































Obs. 40 40 40 40
R. sq. ﬁrst stage 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.61
R. sq. ﬁrst stage 0.55 0.56 0.60 0.94
Sargan test [H0 at 1% level] accepted accepted accepted accepted
Wald test ﬁrst stage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test second stage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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% of the total number of accidents’ causes attributabile to the driver’s behavior
5. SURPASS
4. PSYCHOPHYS. ADULTERATION
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2. SPEEDING
1. INATTENTIVE DRIVING
Figure 1: Causes of highway accidents. Ranking
of the ﬁve most frequent causes of accidents attributable
to the driver’s behavior. Source: our computation of
the data provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics -
ISTAT (2008b).
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Figure 2: Causes of accidents occurring on
roads other than highways. Ranking of the ﬁve
most frequent causes for accidents occurring on roads
other than highways attributable to the driver’s behav-
ior. Source: our computation of the data provided by
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Figure 3: Time series of road accidents. Time
series of the monthly number of total accidents occurred
on the whole Italian road network. Source: Italian In-
stitute of Statistics - ISTAT (2008b).














































10 20 29 40 50 60 70 80 90
Figure 4: Estimated dynamics of speeding of-
fenses. Non - parametric estimate of the monthly num.
of speeding infractions every 1000 vehicles recorded
on highways. Period: March 2001 - September 2008.
Smoothing parameter: 2.3 . The shaded area repre-
sents the reference band for the linear model. Test of
linear model: signiﬁcance = 0. The red and the black
line individuate, respectively, the month in which the
PRM came into force and exhausted its short - term
deterrent eﬀect.













































10 20 29 40 50 60 70 80 90
Figure 5: Estimated dynamics of accidents. Non
- parametric estimate of the monthly num. of total acci-
dents every 1000 vehicles recorded on highways. Period:
March 2001 - September 2008. Smoothing parameter:
10. The shaded area represents the reference band for
the linear model. Test of linear model: signiﬁcance =
0.03. The red and the black line individuate, respec-
tively, the month in which the PRM came into force
and exhausted its short - term deterrent eﬀect.










































Figure 6: PRM and discontinuity in accidents’
dynamics. Plot of the deseasonalized values of the
total number of highway accidents against time. The
vertical dashed line, at July 1, 2003, denotes the day
in which the PPS was introduced. The predicted values
from a ﬁrst order polynomial trend estimated separately
on each side of the cutoﬀ point are also represented.








































Figure 7: PRM and discontinuity in fatal ac-
cidents’ dynamics.. Plot of the deseasonalized val-
ues of the total number of fatal highway fatal accidents
against time. The vertical dashed line, at July 1, 2003,
denotes the day in which the PPS was introduced. The
predicted values from a ﬁrst order polynomial trend es-
timated separately on each side of the cutoﬀ point are
also represented.



















































Figure 8: PRM and discontinuity in the dy-
namics of accidents with only injured persons.
Plot of the deseasonalized values of the total number
of highway accidents causing only non - fatal injuries
against time. The vertical dashed line, at July 1, 2003,
denotes the day in which the PPS was introduced. The
predicted values from a ﬁrst order polynomial trend es-
timated separately on each side of the cutoﬀ point are
also represented.



















































Figure 9: PRM and discontinuity in the dy-
namics of accidents causing only damages to ve-
hicles. Plot of the deseasonalized values of the total
number of highway accidents causing only damages to
vehicles against time. The vertical dashed line, at July
1, 2003, denotes the day in which the PPS was intro-
duced. The predicted values from a ﬁrst order poly-
nomial trend estimated separately on each side of the
cutoﬀ point are also represented.





























































10 29 40 50 60 70 80 90
Figure 10: Estimated dynamics of fatal acci-
dents. Non - parametric estimate of the monthly num.
of fatal accidents per vehicle recorded on highways. Pe-
riod: March 2001 - September 2008. Smoothing param-
eter: 10. The shaded area represents the reference band
for the linear model. Test of linear model: signiﬁcance
= 0.03. The red and the black line individuate, respec-
tively, the month in which the PRM came into force and
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Figure 11: Time series of speeding oﬀenses and
fatal accidents. Time series of the monthly number
of fatal accidents and speeding infractions every 1000
vehicles. The red line individuates the month in which
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Figure 12: Time series of speeding oﬀenses and
total accidents. Time series of the monthly number
of total accidents and speeding infractions every 1000
vehicles. The red line individuates the month in which
the PPS came into force: July 2003.








































10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Figure 13: Estimated dynamics of the Enforce-
ment index. Non - parametric estimate of the aggre-
gated monthly num. of police patrol cars and cameras.
Period: March 2001 - September 2008. Smoothing pa-
rameter: 10. The shaded area represents the reference
band for the linear model. Test of linear model: signif-
icance = 0.52.
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